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Entrepreneurship is generally regarded as a force of change, innovation, and 
development in modern economies. Entrepreneurs bring new and better products to 
markets, restore allocative efficiency through arbitrage and reinvest their profits. 
However, it has been argued that the same energy and talent can also be allocated to 
unproductive ends and reduce total welfare. In this paper we present a model that 
analyzes the allocation of a given entrepreneurial talent over destructive and productive 
activities. 
We show that in this model two stable equilibria can emerge. As Baumol (1990) 
hypothesized, institutions determine the payoffs to both types of entrepreneurial activity 
and hence drive this allocation. But we also show that the distribution of initial wealth 
and entrepreneurial talent play a decisive role. This analysis provides a different 
perspective on the importance of high quality institutions in developing countries and.../ 
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sheds light on the situation in conflict and post-conflict countries, where both informal 
and formal institutions arguably have broken down. Under such circumstances, our 
analysis shows that microcredits can support the transition to a productive equilibrium, 
because they help to overcome credit constraints without creating incentives for 
destructive entrepreneurship. 
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Entrepreneurship is widely recognized as a force of good in market economies.
Schumpeter (1911) puts the entrepreneur center stage in his theory of innova-
tion and capitalist development and Kirzner (1973) ascribed an important role
to proﬁt-driven entrepreneurs to restore market equilibria. Of course the idea
that self-interested and even greedy entrepreneurs could do society some good
in the pursuit of their own fortunes was already established by Adam Smith
and has been a cornerstone in economic thinking since.
Current events in global capital markets, however, illustrate the importance
of the institutions that we build to channel this force and the devastation it can
cause when left unchecked. As for example Baumol (1990), Murphy, Schleifer,
and Vishny (1991), Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2003) and Acemoglu (1995)
have argued, the same energy and talent can also be allocated to unproduc-
tive ends and reduce total welfare. In these models the entrepreneurs can
choose between productive ventures that increase total welfare and redistribu-
tive practices in which they appropriate (legally or illegally) a share of the pro-
ductive entrepreneurs’ proﬁts. This rent-seeking behavior reduces the incen-
tive to engage in productive ventures and it thereby has a negative impact on
aggregate economic activity. As the institutional setting typically rewards such
behavior, institutional reform is typically suggested to prevent it. The problem
with that strategy is that institutions are not so easily built up or changed. If
strong but wrong institutions exist and reward such behavior they are also
likely to persist. For example Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) have
argued that institutions are largely historically determined and in Acemoglu
and Robinson (2008) a model is proposed to explain the persistence of bad in-
stitutions, even in democratic regimes.
If the proper institutions are absent or weak it is not easy to just build the
proper ones overnight. That situation applies to, for example, (post-conﬂict)
developing countries. In such a context pre-existing institutions have broken
down and entrepreneurial talent can turn into a truly destructive force.1 With-
out reducing the need for institutional development in the medium and long
run, in this paper we focus on strategies to improve the incentive structure
under such conditions in the short run. To that end this paper ﬁrst presents
a model of such an economy. That economy is closer to the "stateless soci-
ety" that for example Bates, Greif, and Singh (2002) presents and we follow
Desai, Acs, and Weitzel (2010) in assuming that entrepreneurial talent will be
allocated between productive and truly destructive activities, such as stealing
and raiding productive inputs.2 It is assumed that entrepreneurs can employ
1This also sets our paper apart from the more traditional economic literature on criminal behav-
ior, e.g. Becker (1968), as that literature studies criminal behavior in the context of well-developed
institutions, that fail to eliminate crime. Our entrepreneurial talents are not criminals. They merely
ﬁnd themselves in an institutional vacuum in which they have to choose how to employ their tal-
ents.
2Thereby we follow the talent allocation literature referred to above in assuming the stock of
available entrepreneurial talent in an economy is given exogenously. The institutional setting de-
2their talent and resources in a productive venture, but risk being raided when
doing so. When raided they do not merely lose a share of their proﬁt ﬂow,
as in the models of unproductive entrepreneurship mentioned above, but ac-
tually see their venture terminated, the productive assets liquidated, and the
proceeds consumed by the raiders. This adds insult to injury and reduces both
the incentives and opportunities to engage in productive entrepreneurship in
the next rounds.
Obviously institutional recovery helps. A non-corrupt and well-equipped
police force that will uphold the rule of law can reduce the payoffs to raid-
ing and hence the probability of being raided. That will improve matters and
help the economy move to a productive entrepreneurship equilibrium. The
practical problem with such a strategy is that in the initial state there is no tax
base from which such an investment might be ﬁnanced or sustained. Stuck in
the destructive equilibrium, such a tax base will also not develop and outside
funding for such investments is rarely available. One implication of the model
is that wealth redistribution or the provision of microcredits to productive en-
trepreneurs improves the incentive structure towards more productive activ-
ities and away from destructive entrepreneurship without the requirement to
successfully develop a macro-institutional environment ﬁrst. The mechanism
in the model that enables such a development strategy hinges on the reduc-
tion of credit constraints for many raiding would-be entrepreneurs without
producing very attractive new targets or the remaining raiders.
This paper contributes to three related streams in the literature.
Since Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) there is a longstanding tradition in
economics to study the determinants and consequences of criminal behavior.
This literature relates to our model, because the destructive entrepreneur does
not behave differently from a criminal in the economic crime models. How-
ever, despite a large number of theoretical and empirical studies, this literature
focuses very strongly on the effects of punishment, more particularly, on the
incentive and the incarceration effect of prison sentences (see, e.g., Freeman,
1999). The longer a prison term, the more likely it is both to discourage (incen-
tiveeffect)andtodisable(incarcerationeffect)peoplefromcommittingacrime.
Although the analysis of these effects is crucial for the evaluation of crime pol-
icy, they do not fully apply to our setting, where institutions are assumed to be
weak and policing is largely absent. Furthermore, as the main focus of many
of these models lies on crime deterrence (Cameron, 1998), the theoretical eco-
nomics of crime literature rarely investigates where the proceeds from crimi-
nal activity exactly come from. However, in terms of economic development,
there can be a large difference between fraudulently diverting proﬁts and raid-
ing productive inputs if the former is welfare neutral and the latter welfare
destroying.
Another related ﬁeld of research investigates the determinants of conﬂict.
The so-called predator-prey models in this literature primarily study the emer-
termines the allocation of that given amount of talent over activities that we traditionally consider
entrepreneurial and those that are considered rent-seeking or even criminal.
3gence of conﬂicts and their resolution. As one of the earliest and most promi-
nent contributors in this ﬁeld, Hirshleifer (1987) covered a multitude of aspects
including the analysis of continuing conﬂict (Hirshleifer, 1988), the paradox
of power (Hirshleifer, 1991a), the technology of conﬂict (Hirshleifer, 1991b),
as well as anarchy and its breakdown (Hirshleifer, 1995), culminating in his
Presidential Address to the Western Economic Association in 1993 (Hirshleifer,
1994). These and many other studies in the ﬁeld cover a broad spectrum (e.g.,
Bates, Greif, and Singh, 2002; Neary, 1997; Skaperdas, 1992), although their
main focus is on the effect of rule of law, enforceable property rights and of-
fense or defense technologies on the tradeoff between productive and coercive
activities. As such they provide a very fertile breading ground for economic
models on the allocation of entrepreneurial talent.
In fact, the border between the two research streams on conﬂict and on the
allocation of entrepreneurial talent (e.g., Murphy, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1991;
Acemoglu, 1995) is rather blurred, as the paper by Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik
(2003) on parasitic enterprizes shows. While the former focuses more on the
tradeoff between productive and coercive activities, the latter investigates the
tradeoff between productive and unproductive activities. However, as in the
economics of crime, little attention is spent on the origin of the appropriated
proceeds. More speciﬁcally, the predatory or rent-seeking activities in both
research streams aim at proﬁts, but not, as proposed by Desai, Acs, and Weitzel
(2010), at productive inputs, which is not only unproductive, but destructive,
and directly reduces productive capacity and thereby welfare. Where most
parasiticandpredationmodelsfocusonthestruggleforthegoldeneggs, inour
model the goose actually gets killed. Furthermore, in the existing models the
role of the raider or predator is often ﬁxed, whereas, in our model a formerly
productive but robbed entrepreneur is likely to turn into a raider himself.
The remainder of the paper ﬁrst presents the basic structure and the three
occupations in the model and derives the behavior of and payoffs to those in
theseoccupations. Wethenanalyzethechoiceofoccupationinaone-generation
game to identify what parameters in the model drive the allocation of talent.
In the last section the dynamics in a repeated game overlapping generations
structure are discussed after which we conclude our analysis.
2 The Occupations: Behavior and Payoff
Our model borrows from the overlapping generations model of endogenous
growth with imperfect capital markets as in Galor and Zeira (1993), Barro and
Sala-i Martin (2004) and Aghion and Howitt (1998) and models of occupational
choice and the allocation of entrepreneurial talent such as Murphy, Schleifer,
and Vishny (1991) and Acemoglu (1995). Assume individuals live for two pe-






4For the occupational choice model we focus exclusively on that part of the
population that has the option to become an entrepreneur. The rest of the pop-
ulation is assumed to provide a perfectly elastic labor supply at a subsistence
level wage ws. The N individuals that have more than one option are endowed
with a level of entrepreneurial ability qi that is i.i.d. uniformly distributed over
the interval [0,1] and one unit of labor in the ﬁrst period.3 As we want to
focus on a developing country context we also assume that ﬁnancial interme-
diation is absent and no interest bearing ﬁnancial assets exist. Individuals in
group N then have to ﬁnance investments with their own wealth and savings
do not generate any return unless invested in one’s own productive venture.
Assume an individual receives a random endowment of initial wealth w that
is uniformly and independently identically distributed (i.i.d) over an interval
[wl,wh] and that can be consumed, saved for consumption in period 2, or in-
vested in one’s own venture.4 At the start of the ﬁrst period an individual i in
group N chooses between three available occupations: worker, entrepreneur,
or raider, discussed in detail below. That choice is made based on rational ex-
pectations about the events in the periods ahead. Once the choice is made,
random events are realized and all agents receive their income over period 1.
Then they decide to consume goods and services and save or invest. In the
second period the individuals consume their savings and receive capital in-


























t is the occupation chosen by individual i at time t. An individual
chooses his occupation ﬁrst and then solves the problem in equation 2 con-
ditional on his choice and the random events that follow. The occupation is
chosen to maximize ex ante expected utility. We therefore ﬁrst consider the
maximum expected utility for individual i in each occupation and then work
out who will chose what occupation in section 3.
The individual has three options: worker, entrepreneur, or raider, indexed
by OCi
t= 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Option 1 is to become a worker and receive
the market wage for supplying one unit of labor. When an individual chooses
3Note that our model therefore has nothing to say about the number of (would-be) en-
trepreneurs in an economy. We assume an exogenously given number of people are endowed
with the required talent, knowledge, and risk attitudes and the rest of the population simply is
not. Empirical evidence on entrepreneurial talent and traits shows that this is perhaps a simplistic
but not unreasonable assumption. The talent is assumed to be there, the institutions determine if
and how it will be used.
4It would be a very interesting extension to consider an endogenous distribution of wealth.
One could introduce bequests and make initial wealth dependent on parents’ wealth. However,
that complicates the model and will not help to explain the key mechanism the model intends to
uncover. We therefore leave this for future research.
5to be a worker he cannot invest his wealth in a productive venture and it can
only be held in non-interest bearing assets such as cash or gold.5 These assets
can be consumed at the end of the ﬁrst or the second period. As the wage
is given and the same for all individuals in N, the expected incomes in this
occupation are equal to:
E[Yi
tjOCi
t = 1] = wt
E[Yi
t+1jOCi
t = 1] = 0,
(3)
where wt is the wage that clears the labor market at time t.6 Using the
expressions in equation 3 to substitute and solve the problem in equation 2























Obviously a higher outside wage implies that more individuals will choose
this option. Proposition 1 states this result:
Proposition 1 Ahigheroutsidewagelevelwill, ceterisparibus, causemoreentrepreneurial
talent to allocate into non-entrepreneurial activity.
Individuals in group N can also choose option 2 and become productive
entrepreneurs, investing their initial wealth in productive assets and hiring











t is labor employed, ki
t is the capital stock of individual i at the start
of the period, and k0 is a ﬁxed start-up cost in capital units. As we assume that
there are no ﬁnancial markets, individuals will only choose this option and set
up a productive venture when their initial wealth exceeds k0. In period 1 the
entrepreneur is assumed to supply his labor to his own venture inelastically
and hire additional workers if this is optimal. His entrepreneurial ability qi
operates to increase total factor productivity in the venture. Normalizing the
priceoftheﬁnalgoodto1weknowthataproductiveentrepreneurwillemploy
5For simplicity we abstract from inﬂation. We assume that a risk-free asset with a zero real rate
of return is available.
6We assume that this wage is known and given to group N. This is a reasonable assumption if
group N is small relative to the total population. One can use this variable to see how development
and economic growth affect the tradeoffs.
6all his initial wealth endowment as capital ki
t = wi
t and hires labor to maximize










t   k0)1 a   wtli
t. (6)









t   k0). (7)
Note that for every individual productive entrepreneur the demand for la-
bor is negative in the wage level. Total demand for labor in the entrepreneurial
sector is the sum of these individual demands over all productive ventures and
this yields a downward sloping labor demand curve. The total income of a pro-
ductive entrepreneur in period t is equal to the market wage plus a venture-
speciﬁc return on his capital. Substituting for capital and labor in equation 4






t   k0) + wt, (8)
where it can be veriﬁed that the venture-speciﬁc expected return on capital,
ri








t   1 is positive in entrepreneurial talent, q and neg-
ative in the wage level wt. In period t + 1 the productive entrepreneur cannot
supply his own labor as he is old, but he can invest his savings from period t
once more into his own venture. He is then entitled to the proﬁt ﬂows in period
t + 1 and his savings from period 1 yield a positive return.
This occupation, however, is not without risk in our model. The productive
entrepreneur can be raided by a destructive entrepreneur, who will seize his
assets and liquidate them. When raided, the productive entrepreneur looses
his venture and can only hope to ﬁnd a job in period t.8 He will then earn wt
as a worker but has lost his initial wealth endowment. When there are destruc-
tive entrepreneurs in the economy the value of productive entrepreneurship is
therefore rated down relative to the other two occupations as the probability
of being raided and receiving only the market wage is positive. Assuming that
this probability is given by xi




t = 2] = (1  E[xi
t])((1+ ri
t)(wi









7Employing less than the entire available wealth would imply that total income from the ven-
ture is below its maximum as long as the return on capital in that venture is positive. This is a
result of our simplifying assumption that wealth can be consumed also after use in the venture. A
more realistic approach would be to introduce depreciation, but that would add a lot of complexity
to the model and create little additional insights.
8We eliminate the possibility that he chooses to become a destructive entrepreneur for now.
7where ki
t+1 = (1+ ri
t)(wi
t   k0) + wt   ci
t is the amount invested in the ven-
ture at the end of period 1 and ri








t+1   1 is the period
2 rate of return on capital. E[xi
t] is the expected probability that venture i is
raided in period t and will be endogenized below. We assume for simplic-
ity that a productive venture that survives the ﬁrst period can be maintained
without the risk of being raided in the next period. Using these expressions in

































From this equation one can immediately derive propositions 2 and 3:
Proposition 2 A higher level of entrepreneurial talent will, ceteris paribus, increase
the attractiveness of productive entrepreneurship.
Proposition 3 A higher level of initial wealth will, ceteris paribus, increase the at-
tractiveness of productive entrepreneurship.
From equation 10 using the deﬁnitions of ri
t, ri
t+1, and pi
t one can also
derive that higher wage levels do not unambiguously make productive en-
trepreneurship more or less attractive. They increase the wage income and
the utility value of the fall-back option when the venture is raided, but higher
wages also reduce the return on capital invested. The sign of the effect de-
pends on the raiding probability xi
t and the output elasticity of labor a. Also,
it should be noted that ceteris paribus will not hold when we endogenize the
raiding probability below.
Occupation 3 in the model is the destructive entrepreneur or raider who
conﬁscates and liquidates the assets of productive entrepreneurs. We assume
that destructive entrepreneurs select one victim from the pool of productive
entrepreneurs. When selecting a victim they do not perceive the amount of as-
sets employed in a venture perfectly. Destructive entrepreneurs are therefore
assumed to select their victim at random but the probability of being selected
and raided is assumed to be proportional to the level of productive assets em-
ployed in the venture. To operationalize these assumptions we simply assume
that each unit of capital is equally likely to be raided. The probability that any










8where we index the individuals in the group N from 0 to n such that indi-
viduals 0 to n1 are the N1 individuals that choose to be workers. Individuals
n1 to n2 are the N2 productive entrepreneurs and individuals n2 to n are N3 de-
structive entrepreneurs and N1 + N2 + N3 = N. This also implies that the total












We assume that destructive entrepreneurs are all equally likely to select a
given productive venture and therefore the expected level of assets seized is
equal to the total level of assets seized in equation 12 divided by the num-
ber of destructive entrepreneurs N3. Assuming that a talented destructive en-
trepreneur is better able to liquidate the captured assets and sell them off, the















t = 3] = 0.
(13)
It can be veriﬁed in equation (13) that the expected period 1 income for
raiders is equal to a share l(qi) of the average level of capital employed, only
when all productive entrepreneurs have an equal amount of capital installed.
As was derived above, productive entrepreneurs will invest their entire initial
wealth, such that this result would only materialize when the initial wealth
distribution is equal among those that choose productive entrepreneurship. If
the initial wealth distribution among productive entrepreneurs is not ﬂat, how-
ever, then the average destructive entrepreneur expects to seize above average
assets. Solving the consumer’s problem in equation 2 using these expected
incomes yield the ex ante expected utility of occupation 3:
E[Ui
tjOCi


































This allows us to formulate propositions 4, 5, and 6:
Proposition 4 Moreconcentratedproductiveassets, ceterisparibus, makedestructive
entrepreneurship more attractive.
9Proposition 5 Higher entrepreneurial talent, ceteris paribus, makes destructive en-
trepreneurship more attractive.
Proposition 6 Higher initial wealth, ceteris paribus, makes destructive entrepreneur-
ship more attractive.
The proofs follow directly from equation 14.
3 Choosing among Occupations
This section will analyze which individuals will choose what occupation by
comparing the ex ante expected utility levels in equations 4, 10, and 14. As
the propositions have shown, there are variables that affect the absolute utility
level of one or more occupations in different or the same direction. In this sec-
tion the relative attractiveness of occupations is considered. First consider the
choice between wage labor and destructive entrepreneurship. An individual is
indifferent between these occupations when the ex ante expected utility levels
are equal. Equations 4 and 14 show that an individual will choose to engage in
destructive entrepreneurship when:
wt < l(qi)zt, (15)









. Note that this variable is the
same for all individuals i and represents the inequality in the initial wealth
distribution among those that choose productive entrepreneurship. Assuming
l can be inverted we can derive the threshold level of entrepreneurial talent ¯ q
for which individuals are indifferent between work and raiding. Above that
threshold level of entrepreneurial talent individuals will choose for raiding:






Note that the threshold level depends negatively on the wage level and
positively on the inequality of the initial wealth distribution among productive
entrepreneurs but does not depend on the level of initial wealth of individual
i.
Now consider the choice between productive entrepreneurship and wage
labor. Those with initial wealth levels below k0 will choose occupation 1 over 2
at all levels of talent because they simply cannot start a venture. Starting at ini-
tial wealth level k0, however, there is a positive level of entrepreneurial talent
that is required to make entrepreneurship the preferred option, even without
10the threat of being raided. This threshold level in entrepreneurial talent can be
derived by setting equations 4 and 10 equal and assuming x=0. We then obtain:









which deﬁnes the threshold level ˜ q for entrepreneurial talent, below which
all individuals would choose employment over productive entrepreneurship.
This threshold level is increasing in initial wealth as the right hand side of
equation 17 is decreasing in the level of initial wealth. The intuition for this
result is that, at higher levels of wealth, the consumption of employees rises
one for one, whereas for the entrepreneur diminishing returns to capital kick
in. To compensate for that, a higher level of entrepreneurial talent is required.
However, if there is a positive probability of being raided and that probability
depends positively on the level of wealth, as we have assumed above, then the
tradeoff changes and an even higher level of threshold talent is required. Using
equations 4 and 10 without restrictions on x we can show that an individual
























qi)  rlog(1 + ri
t+1) + (1 + r)log
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deﬁned to save on notation. This function is positive in the second argument
due to the positive relationship between the rates of return on entrepreneurial
ventures, ri
t and ri
t+1, and entrepreneurial talent, qi. Equation 18 allows us to
state propositions 7 and 8:
Proposition 7 Foreveryindividuali, endowedwithentrepreneurialtalent qi>˜ q, there
exists a unique level of initial wealth ˜ wi
t>k0 for which that individual is indifferent be-
tween occupations 1 and 2. At wealth levels below this threshold level he will prefer
entrepreneurship over wage labor.
Proposition 8 The threshold wealth level in proposition 7 depends positively on the
level of entrepreneurial talent.
The proof for both propositions follows from the properties of equation 18.
An individual prefers entrepreneurship over wage labor when the probability
of being raided is low. That probability is given on the left hand side and it was
assumed to be linear in wi
t and zero when the initial wealth level is equal to k0.
On the right hand side is the raiding probability for which the two occupations
give the same ex ante expected utility. It can be veriﬁed in equation 18 that the
right hand side is strictly decreasing in the initial wealth level and is positive
for an initial wealth of k0. Moreover, the limit of the right hand side for initial
11wealth going to inﬁnity is equal to 0. The expression in equation 18 has no
closed form solution, but when we draw the left hand and right hand side into
a wi
t, xi -plane we ﬁnd the unique threshold wealth level in Figure 1.





qi) is positive in qi and appears in the numerator and
denominator on the right hand side we can derive that the right hand side
depends positively on the level of entrepreneurial talent. It is then clear that a
more talented entrepreneur is willing to take a higher risk of being raided as
he is compensated by higher returns on the venture.
Figure 1: Graphical Derivation of ¯ wi
t
Source: Own Compilation
As individuals with a wealth level below k0 do not have the option to be-
come productive entrepreneurs, even if they would prefer to be, proposition 4
implies that only those at intermediate levels of initial wealth, between k0 and
˜ wi
t will choose entrepreneurship over labor. The poor cannot set up a venture
and the very rich will not risk their wealth.
The tradeoff between productive and destructive entrepreneurship can be
analyzed in a similar fashion. From equations 10 and 14 we can derive that an

















qi)   (1+ r)log(wt)
. (19)
12This expression allows us to state propositions 9 and 10:
Proposition 9 For every individual i, endowed with entrepreneurial talent qi>¯ q there
exists a unique level of initial wealth ¯ wi
t>k0 for which that individual is indifferent
between occupations 2 and 3. At wealth levels below this threshold level he will prefer
productive over destructive entrepreneurship.
Proposition 10 The threshold wealth level in proposition 9 depends negatively on the
level of entrepreneurial talent.
The proof again follows the same logic and depends on the different prop-
erties of the right hand side in equation 19. The right hand side takes a value
between 0 and 1 at initial wealth level k0 when occupation 3 is preferred over
occupation 1 (see equation 15). The right hand side is once more downward
sloping and has an asymptote at 0 as the raider does not risk his initial wealth
and the productive entrepreneur does. And again there is a unique point of
intersection that determines the threshold initial wealth level for which an in-
dividual is indifferent. Above that level the probability of being raided exceeds
the acceptable level and individuals choose to become raiders themselves. The
corresponding graph would be similar to the one in Figure 1, although of
course the threshold initial wealth levels are not. Also, this time the right hand
side of equation 19 depends negatively on entrepreneurial talent as that talent
also increases the payoff to raiding. This implies that the threshold level of
initial wealth will decline as the talent increases.
We can now draw the derived threshold levels of qi and wi
t into a box-
diagram that has qi on the vertical axis, running from 0 to 1 and wi
t on the
horizontal one, running from wl to wh.
The allocation of individuals over the various occupations can now be de-
termined by drawing the thresholds levels ¯ q, ˜ wi
t(qi), ˜ q(wi
t), and ¯ wi
t(qi) into the
box. It can be veriﬁed in the underlying equations that ˜ wi
t(1)> ¯ wi
t(1) when we
assume that the most talented entrepreneur will prefer raiding to labor and ¯ q
is less than 1. From equations 18 and 19 we know that the two w-curves will
intersect at ¯ q and the box has 8 areas. These areas are labeled A to H in Figure
2 above.
We have assumed i.i.d. uniformly distributed endowments so the relative
size of the areas in the box represent the proportions of the population that will
choose one occupation over another. By considering the bilateral comparisons
in each of the enclosed areas in the box we can derive which area chooses what
occupation. In all ﬁgures in area A there is too little wealth to become a produc-
tive entrepreneur, but enough talent to be successful as a raider. In area B there
is too little wealth to start a venture and too little talent to become a successful
raider. So these individuals choose employment. Those in area C and D have
sufﬁcient wealth to engage in a productive venture but not so much that they
must fear raiding. They choose productive entrepreneurship. Those in areas












E and F have too much wealth to want to become productive entrepreneurs
for fear of raiders, but lack the talent to be successful raiders themselves. So
they too choose employment. Those in areas G and H choose destructive en-
trepreneurship over employment and productive entrepreneurship. The areas
of productive entrepreneurship are dark-shaded in Figure 2 whereas the light
shaded areas are those for which entrepreneurial talent allocates into destruc-
tive activities.
4 Comparative Statics: What Drives the Talent Al-
location?
4.1 The Entry Barrier k0
It is clear from the ﬁgures that lower initial capital requirements k0 will reduce
the size of the rectangular areas A and B in all ﬁgures. From equation 17 we
can also observe that for a reduction in k0, ˜ q will fall, causing the areas C, D,
and E to increase. The ¯ w and ˜ w-curves will also respond. The reduction in
k0 will reduce the probability of being raided for individual ventures if the
venture is above average size, whereas it will increase that probability for the
smaller than average ventures. This implies the ˜ w and ¯ w curves will rotate
14clockwise. The negative effect of k0 on the W-functions deﬁned above implies
that for every level of talent the ˜ w curve will shift up for a decrease in k0,
whereas for the ¯ w curve the threshold level of talent decreases for every level
of initial wealth and the curve shifts down. Their intersection point will move
horizontally to the right as long as ¯ q is not affected, causing areas C and D to
grow further at the expense of areas H and E. There are no ﬁrst order effects on
¯ q, but because a possible larger spread in the size of entrepreneurial ventures
willincreasetheattractivenessofraidingthrough z, ¯ q mayshiftdown. Asthese
effects are second order effects, however, it can be concluded that the shifts in
˜ w, ˜ q, and the k0 line all work towards increasing the number of productive
entrepreneurs.
The shift in the ¯ w-curve has an ambiguous effect. A reduction in the costs
of setting up a venture, or, alternatively, reducing the ﬁnancing constraints on
small productive ventures, will produce less destructive entrepreneurship of
the talented poor (area A smaller) and induce more people to switch from em-
ployment into productive entrepreneurship (area E to D). This positive effect
of decreasing k0 may be offset by a possible increase in areas H and G. One
implication from this is that microcredits can help to make the transition to a
productive equilibrium. Microcredits could provide an incentive to switch into
productive entrepreneurship at the individual level by helping to overcome
the credit constraints. As the productive assets that they ﬁnance are not easily
captured, these assets are unlikely to create enough incentives for a switch to
destructive entrepreneurship at the aggregate level.
4.2 Initial Wealth wL, wH
A spread preserving increase in the mean level of initial wealth will shift the
box to the right and simply add to the light area on the right what is lost on
the left. Such a shift would only start to have an impact on the relative size
of the occupations when wL exceeds k0, in which case there are no more credit
constraints. As that is not a very interesting case we consider shifting the lower
and upper bound separately.
Ifonly wL increases, then areasAandBbecome smaller asabove. Thistime,
however, there is no further impact on any of the curves as the minimum level
of initial wealth has no ﬁrst order impact on any of the tradeoffs. However,
as the number of raiding entrepreneurs falls, the incentives to engage in pro-
ductive entrepreneurship increase. The fall in N3 will reduce the probability
of being raided, thereby lowering the level of talent for every level of wealth
for which an individual prefers productive entrepreneurship over labor. The
˜ w-curve will shift down and to the right, increasing the number of productive
entrepreneurs. This effect is partially offset by the downward shift in the ¯ w
curve.
Increases in wH will have the opposite effects. The number of destructive
entrepreneurs will increase and the curves shift in the opposite direction.
154.3 Wages wt, wt+1
The current wage level wt affects all curves in the graphs. The direct impact
of wt on ˜ q is negative. The current wage wt has an ambiguous effect on the
˜ w-curve. On the one hand both wages drive the W-functions down, which in-
creases the right hand side of equation 18 and thus shifts the curve to the right.
On the other hand, an increasing wage level reduces the right hand side, as
the relative importance of initial wealth levels is reduced. As both effects work
in opposite direction, it is unclear how the curve will shift. In the comparison
with destructive entrepreneurship the effect of an increase in the wage level is
unambiguously positive on the right hand side, causing the ¯ w-curve to shift
up and to the right. Finally, ¯ q is positive in the current wage level. The net ﬁrst
order effect of an increase in the wage level is then an increase in the number of
employees, as areas B, E, and F will increase and area D increases one for one at
the expense of C. The shift in the ¯ w-curve increases the number of productive
entrepreneurs in area C as they have the current wage as their fall-back posi-
tion. The ambiguous effect on ˜ w may offset this positive effect on the number
of productive entrepreneurs, but the number of destructive entrepreneurs will
unambiguously fall as G+H+A will be smaller.
The future wage only affects the rate of return on productive entrepreneur-
ship in our one-generation one shot model. Hence, larger future wages de-
crease the attractiveness of productive entrepreneurship vis-à-vis the alterna-
tives. ˜ q increases, ˜ w shifts up but rotates down because the lower returns need
to be offset with higher initial investments. The tradeoff between employment
and destructive entrepreneurship is not affected, so ¯ q stays where it is. ¯ w will
shift to intersect ˜ w at ¯ q. It is a priori unclear if the intersection point moves
horizontally to the right or left.
The effects of both wages together imply that in an economy with high
growth in wage levels, employment will be increasingly attractive and produc-
tive entrepreneurship is less attractive relative to employment and destructive
entrepreneurship.
4.4 Inequality zt
Finally, we can consider the impact of a larger initial wealth inequality among
productiveentrepreneurs. Thisvariableis, however, notanexogenousvariable
in our model. The width of the area C-D in the graph gives the spread of ini-
tial wealth in the population of productive entrepreneurs. If it were to increase
exogenously then ¯ q would shift down and cause more employees to switch to
destructive entrepreneurship. As that happens the w-curves will shift/rotate
down as well but ˜ q would not fall. This is because the zero raid probability
level of talent for which an individual is indifferent between employment and
entrepreneurship does not depend upon the probability of being raided. As
the ¯ w-curve shifts to the left, however, the spread of initial wealth for the pro-
ductive entrepreneurs is squeezed and this provides an offsetting force. As the
spread of initial wealth for productive entrepreneurs is an endogenous vari-
16able, determined by the position of the various curves, all this exercise shows is
that the allocation is inherently stable. A similar argument holds for variables
N1, N2, and N3. The comparative static effects of shifts in the parameters of the
model a and r are complex and hard to interpret in terms of policy implica-
tions. In the ﬁnal subsection we will therefore consider the impact of stronger
institutions as captured in l(q).
4.5 Institutions l(q)
Institutional strength in our model implies that a government enforces prop-
ertyrightsandprotectstheproductiveentrepreneursfromthedestructiveones.
To capture this in the model, we assume that these government ofﬁcials can re-
duce the returns to a given level of entrepreneurial talent by reducing the part
of captured assets that can be consumed by the raider. This reﬂects the fact
that it is always possible to raid a productive venture, but strong institutions
prevent one from enjoying the proceeds. Strong institutions therefore shift the
function l(q) to the right and down, implying that a higher level of talent is
now required to consume the same share of assets captured as before. In the
graph such a shift would cause ¯ w to shift to the right. Also ¯ q would move up.
As there is no impact on the other curves it is clear that this reduces the incen-
tives for the rich and thepoor to engage in destructive entrepreneurship. When
institutions are strong enough to push the ¯ w curve to the point where ¯ q=1, all
destructive entrepreneurship is eliminated. All economies with institutional
strength below that level have a group of poor destructive entrepreneurs and
some very rich ones. This, we believe, gives an adequate description, even for
most developed countries.
5 Extension to Overlapping Generations and Con-
cluding Remarks
When the model is analyzed in an overlapping generations dynamic repeated
gamesetting, theresultswillbedifferent. Afullblownanalysisofsuchamodel
is beyond the scope of this paper. For now, we speculate on the outcomes of
such an analysis using the propositions and properties that were derived in the
static model above.
The essence of an overlapping generations model is that two cohorts co-
exist in the model and the decisions of the old affect the choices of the young.
If one abstracts from inheritance and still has a random distribution of ini-
tial wealth for every generation, the model should take into account that pro-
ductive entrepreneurial ventures can now be raided in both time periods. In
an overlapping generations structure the incentive to raid is therefore, ceteris
paribus, higherforeveryindividualineverycohort. Thisisarelativelystraight-
forward extension to the static, one-generation model above and it increases
the likelihood that any individual chooses destructive entrepreneurship. As
17a result, a larger proportion of the total population will engage in destructive
entrepreneurship, reducing the levels of productive activity.
The analysis becomes much more complicated when we assume that the
young inherit their initial endowments from their parents and individuals act
to maximize the utility of their dynasty. In that case high levels of raiding will
reduce the inherited wealth and the box will tend to move to the left, causing
more and more raiding until all initial wealth is below k0. As the number of
productive entrepreneurs falls, however, so will the incentives to raid and the
economy would then end up in an all employment equilibrium. In such an
equilibrium, however, wealth starts to accumulate and the box shifts to the
right again. There is a priori no reason to exclude dynamic equilibria that have
repetitive cycles or even a chaotic system that cycles but never repeats itself.
As the model above does not specify how entrepreneurship contributes to
economic growth, there can be no predictions on the growth regimes that may
result. But it is relatively easy to see that, if productive entrepreneurship posi-
tively affects growth, the mechanism described above implies that various pos-
sibilities exist. Depending on the parameters of the model an economy may be
stuck in a no growth equilibrium, a high growth equilibrium, or a continuous
cycle of booms and busts. Such economic growth would feed back into the
model through higher growth rates of wages in employment, causing an even
more complex dynamic process.
What is clear from the static analysis above is that stronger institutions will
help an economy switch to productive entrepreneurship in the long run, but as
such policies are hard to implement, strategies to reduce credit constraints by
setting up ﬁnancial intermediation and the provision of microcredits may be a
promising way to start.
The impact of more traditional forms of development aid can also be dis-
cussed in the context of our model. Such aid from the outside, in kind or ﬁnan-
cially, will shift the incentives to raid or engage in productive entrepreneurship
in favor of the raiding, because aid, especially if it enters the country through a
few bottlenecks in the distribution chain, will create additional targets for raid-
ing and reduce the returns from, for example, farming food or producing ne-
cessities. Our model does not account for the possibility that such aid will also
draw entrepreneurial talent from both raiding and productive ventures into
rent-seeking and aid maximizing activities, which may render the economy
aid dependent and stuck in a non-productive zero-growth equilibrium that is
not characterized by the booms and busts in raiding. This issue remains on the
agenda for further research as proper analysis of this mechanism requires sub-
stantial extensions to our current model. Nevertheless, we may conclude from
our model that institutional improvements constitute a medium to long run
growth strategy, whereas the reduction of credit constraints, without attracting
destructive raiders (or unproductive rent-seekers) in the process, is a sensible
short term development strategy.
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